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Abstract
Reducing the number of foreigners residing unlawfully within the borders of a state requires either 
their removal or the legalisation of their presence within the territory. Increasingly, governments 
also employ measures of internal control and limit irregular migrants’ access to rights and services 
in order to encourage them to leave autonomously. This article aims to contribute to current 
debates on how to conceptualise and account for the agency that irregular migrants themselves 
exercise in such contexts. Within critical migration and citizenship studies, many of their everyday 
actions have been described as ‘acts of citizenship’ but also as instances of ‘becoming imperceptible’, 
neither of which captures the whole range of strategies irregular migrants employ to strengthen 
their fragile position vis-à-vis the state. I argue that conceptualising their agency in terms of (self-)
integration allows us to account for both: practices through which they actively become political 
subjects as well as those that precisely constitute a deliberate refusal to do so. Empirically, this 
is underpinned by an analysis of recent policy developments in the United Kingdom and a series 
of semi-structured interviews I conducted during 8 months of fieldwork in London with migrants 
experiencing different kinds and degrees of irregularity.
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Introduction
At the very foundation of receiving states’ efforts to effectively manage the entry and stay 
of foreigners who want to settle within their territories lies the seemingly clear-cut and 
binary distinction between ‘legal’ or ‘regular’ migrants and those whose immigration 
or residence is deemed ‘illegal’ or ‘irregular’.1 While integration, however defined, is 
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expected only of the former, it is the latter that in recent years have increasingly domi-
nated the public and political discourse and spurred many of the regulatory measures 
taken in the field of immigration, both at the level of the European Union (EU) and indi-
vidual Member States. Despite intensifying control and surveillance of its external bor-
ders, between 1.9 and 3.8 million people were estimated to be residing ‘illegally’ within 
the EU by 2008 (CLANDESTINO, 2009), often after entering lawfully but subsequently 
overstaying their tourist visa or temporary residence permit.
A state that faces sizeable (although always uncertain) numbers of immigrants living 
irregularly within its borders can tacitly accept their unlawful stay (together with the weak-
ening of its sovereignty that entails), legalise their presence or physically remove them 
from both its territory and jurisdiction.2 Available policy measures to reduce the number of 
irregular residents can thus be thought of as a continuum ranging from regularisation to 
deportation. For receiving states, they both serve pragmatic as well as symbolic functions 
and have been described as constitutive elements of citizenship (De Genova, 2002; Walters, 
2002) and nation-building (McDonald, 2009). From the migrant perspective, ‘being 
irregular’ can thus be defined as an in-between state framed by the very possibility of being 
either regularised or deported (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2010). Irregularity itself, as many criti-
cal migration scholars have argued, should primarily be seen as deliberately produced by 
certain state authorities and laws, rather than being the consequence of individual migrants’ 
actions in neglect or violation of immigration restrictions (De Genova, 2002; Düvell, 2011; 
Goldring et al., 2009). At the same time, much academic work has highlighted irregular 
migrants’ agency in contesting, undermining or overcoming the legal restrictions, admin-
istrative barriers and everyday risks they face as a result of their status (Black et al., 2006; 
Bloch et al., 2011; Broeders and Engbersen, 2007; Ellermann, 2010; Inda, 2011; Sigona, 
2012; Vasta, 2011). One aspect that potentially links these different strands of literature but 
until now has received comparatively little scholarly attention is irregular migrants’ inte-
gration within host societies and its interference with immigration enforcement (notable 
exceptions are Chauvin and Garcés-Mascareñas, 2014; Kraler, 2011; Leerkes et al., 2007; 
Leerkes et al., 2012; Palidda, 1998; Sandoval, 2014; Vasta, 2011). This is surprising given 
the fact that the so-called ‘fight against illegal immigration’ increasingly targets various 
kinds of social and economic relations (Walsh, 2014) and intersects with other strands of 
(mainstream) public policy, most notably the welfare regime (Broeders and Engbersen, 
2007; Lahav and Guiraudon, 2006). This policy trend towards the prevention of unlawful 
residents’ integration rather than entry is particularly explicit in the United Kingdom, 
where the government is officially trying to ‘create here in Britain a really hostile environ-
ment for illegal migration’.3
In this context, this article seeks to contribute to current debates on how to conceptual-
ise and account for the agency of irregular migrants by exploring the dialectical relation-
ship between the evolving policy frameworks for their regularisation, deportation and 
internal control, and migrants’ own practices and strategies to consolidate their situation 
in the United Kingdom. More specifically, my analysis suggests that one of the most 
effective ways for them to achieve this is by integrating into various spheres of local eve-
ryday life. Given their official exclusion from formal integration routes, this often requires 
deliberate acts of self-integration, but also a careful management of the visibility that they 
are thereby likely to gain. It also depends on the inclusiveness of institutions and the 
benevolence and support of other members of society, who in turn are increasingly tar-
geted by (or enlisted for) immigration law enforcement. In the following three sections, I 
will situate these acts of integration against the state first theoretically – within academic 
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debates around migrant irregularity and agency – and then empirically – both from a 
policy perspective and through some original accounts of irregular migrants themselves.
Migrant irregularity and irregular migrants’ integration as a 
form of agency
Migrant irregularity is always linked to particular (national) frameworks of immigration 
regulation and restriction. These automatically render ‘illegal’ the presence of any for-
eigner who does not (or does not any longer) fulfil the requirements established for legal 
entry, stay and/or employment in the country so that ‘the contours of illegality mirror those 
of legality’ (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2010: 80). On one hand, this relates the growth of irreg-
ular migration to the increasing restrictiveness of immigration policies, comprising the 
dispersal and stricter policing of external as well as internal borders, the ever more 
restricted access to asylum and more demanding requirements for labour as well as family-
related admission. On the other hand, the ever-increasing complexity and diversification 
of these various policy regimes explain some of the conceptual difficulties surrounding 
contemporary migrant irregularity, which a growing number of scholars are trying to 
overcome by questioning the strict dichotomy between ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ migratory sta-
tus. While some have suggested alternative concepts that capture a more fluid range of 
in-between statuses (Goldring et al., 2009; Kubal, 2013; Ruhs and Anderson, 2010), others 
emphasise the increasing diversity of potential paths into and out of irregularity (Black et 
al., 2006; Calavita, 2003; Cvajner and Sciortino, 2010a; Düvell, 2011), as well as a certain 
hierarchy among different kinds of irregular status (Chauvin and Garcés-Mascareñas, 
2012; Cvajner and Sciortino, 2010a). It has also been shown that irregular migrants are 
often incorporated into some spheres of society (whether formally or informally) but 
simultaneously excluded from others (Castles, 1995; Chauvin and Garcés-Mascareñas, 
2014; Cvajner and Sciortino, 2010b; Mezzadra, 2011; Ruhs and Anderson, 2010). De 
Genova (2013) therefore speaks of ‘inclusion through exclusion’, while Mezzadra and 
Neilson (2013: 159) employ the notion of ‘differential inclusion’ to describe how some 
migrants’ inclusion ‘can be subject to varying degrees of subordination, rule, discrimina-
tion, and segmentation’, thereby implying a certain function and intentionality that under-
lie the production of migrant irregularity. Empirical studies that have scrutinised the 
condition of irregular migrants living in different European countries not only highlight 
their vulnerability, frequent exploitation, lack of rights and exclusion from many public 
institutions and services (Bloch et al., 2009; Spencer and Hughes, 2015; Van Der Leun, 
2006) but also emphasise various instances and forms of agency through which they often 
successfully challenge internal bordering practices and resist in-country immigration 
enforcement (Ellermann, 2010; Inda, 2011; Sigona, 2012; Vasta, 2011).
It is precisely the diffuse condition under which irregular migrants are present in the 
host country and become implicated in various spheres of life and politics which renders 
difficult the conceptualisation of their agency. What I want to stress here is that much of 
this agency resembles popular understandings and expectations of ‘integration’, that is, of 
how newcomers in general can and should become part of, and accepted by, the receiving 
society, whether through participation, incorporation or assimilation.4 Based on the eve-
ryday experiences of irregular migrants living in the United Kingdom, Sigona (2012: 51) 
identifies their agency in ‘the ways they shape and adapt daily routines and mundane 
social interactions to changing circumstances, precarious livelihoods, and the protracted 
and concrete possibility of being deported’. Others have highlighted the crucial role of 
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‘informal’ integration strategies (Leerkes et al., 2007; Palidda, 1998; Sandoval, 2014) and 
argued that differentiating ‘marginal’ from ‘incorporated’ irregular migrants helps ‘to 
understand practices of in-country migration policing’ (Leerkes et al., 2012: 450). 
However, their agency must not just be seen as a reaction to the exclusionary thrust of 
legal-political frameworks and structures but also as a strategic employment of poten-
tially inclusive aspects of the law, such as formal pathways to regularisation or fundamen-
tal rights legislation. Chauvin and Garcés-Mascareñas (2014: 423) have shown that it is 
through ‘both the legal and illegal integration […] into the formal institutions of their 
societies of residence’ that they can effectively become ‘less illegal’.
On one hand, then, irregular migrants can undermine their ascribed ‘illegality’ not only 
by actively participating in social and economic life, or by claiming rights but also by build-
ing interpersonal links and networks of solidarity. Many of their everyday (inter)actions, 
claims and decisions – from making friends to accessing public services – are premised on, 
as well as reflect, their being (at least partially) recognised not only as de facto members 
of society but often also as subjects of politics. It is in this sense that at least some of these 
instances must be seen as ‘acts of citizenship’, which Isin (2008: 16) has defined as ‘prac-
tices of becoming claim-making subjects in and through various sites and scales’. What 
characterises such acts is precisely that they lack explicit authorisation and ‘break away 
from the expected, routine and habitual ways of performing a script that is already insti-
tuted’ (Isin, 2013: 24). Arguably, irregular migrants’ claims for a right to remain on the basis 
of ‘being integrated’ in a place where they reside unlawfully represent such a break.
On the other hand, however, not every instance of irregular migrants’ agency (and 
integration) necessarily implies making a claim, or becoming visible (or known) to other 
citizens or (state) institutions. Instead, their self-integration can also have the opposite 
aim of becoming (or remaining) invisible, thereby reflecting an assimilationist under-
standing of integration as ‘blending into society’ in order not to be identified as ‘foreign’ 
or, in this case, ‘irregular’. Particularly in contexts where access to formal employment, 
mainstream services and other rights is made strictly contingent on legal residence sta-
tus, the renting or buying of false identity documents becomes an alternative ‘route to 
local integration’ and thus ‘one way in which immigrants deprived of rights and power 
can develop agency’ (Vasta, 2011: 188). Other empirical studies have shown that 
migrants can successfully resist (or at least delay) deportation by hiding or destroying 
their passport or other documents (Ellermann, 2010). For Papadopoulos and Tsianos 
(2007: 229), such instances indicate ‘a new form of politics and a new formation of 
active political subjects whose aim is not to find a different way to become or to be a 
political subject, but to refuse to become a subject at all’. They maintain that while 
irregular migrants do ‘become stronger when they become visible by obtaining rights’, 
they sometimes rather want ‘to become everybody by refusing to become integrated 
and assimilated in the logic of border administration’ (Papadopoulos and Tsianos, 2007: 
229–230). By ‘becoming imperceptible’, they thus manage to escape from what the 
authors call the ‘double-R axiom’, that is, the normalised (although highly unequal) 
allocation of representation and rights, through which different categories of people are 
assigned particular positions within (or outside of) the nation-state order (Papadopoulos 
et al., 2008; Papadopoulos and Tsianos, 2007). From this perspective, irregular migrants 
can best avoid effective exclusion by ‘living a normal life’, even though often under 
someone else’s name. Rather than making visible claims for more inclusion or specific 
rights, they simply refuse to take their designated place at the margins of society. In 
the following sections I will show that irregular migrants’ self-integration into British 
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society necessarily involves both ‘acts of citizenship’ and instances of ‘becoming imper-
ceptible’ and that it is through both that they routinely interact with exclusionary as well 
as inclusionary state policies.
The UK policy approach to irregular migration and 
residence: Between regularisation, deportation and the 
prevention of ‘illegal’ integration
Offering opportunities for regularisation to foreigners in irregular situations is a wide-
spread practice throughout the EU (Apap et al., 2000; Levinson, 2005), where between 
1973 and 2008 more than 4.3 million people have been regularised through a total of 68 
national programmes (Kraler, 2009). In the United Kingdom, regularisation has histori-
cally played a minor role and various governments have officially rejected the idea of 
granting an ‘amnesty’ to those ‘breaking the rules’, often arguing that this would attract 
even more irregular migrants (Papademetriou and Somerville, 2008). But given the fact 
that ‘[s]ome form of regularisation is unavoidable if a growing underclass of people 
[…] is not to be created’, as the House of Lords Committee on the EU declared in 2002 
(cited in Levinson, 2005: 31), an estimated number of 60,000–100,000 irregular resi-
dents have been granted some form of legal status between 1997 and 2008 (Papademetriou 
and Somerville, 2008). Several small-scale one-off regularisations became necessary as 
the result of a tightening of immigration rules – like the sudden extension of the concept 
of ‘illegal entry’ to Commonwealth citizens in 1971 (Levinson, 2005) – and in order to 
reduce the pressure on the asylum system, particularly between the mid-1990s and 
early 2000s. In addition, the British immigration regime also relies on permanent mech-
anisms of regularisation: the so-called long residence rule allows foreigners who have 
continuously lived in the country for 20 years and regardless of their immigration status 
to make an application for Leave to Remain (LTR), while a similar regulation is in 
place for family cases involving minor children who have lived in the United Kingdom 
for at least 7 years. During this time, the Home Office (2012: 6) argues, ‘a child will 
generally establish a sufficient level of integration for family and private life to exist 
such that removal would normally not be in the best interests of the child’. Since 
December 2012, however, applicants who fulfil these requirements also need to prove 
a lack of social, cultural or family ties to their country of citizenship. In addition, the 
Immigration Act of 2014 stipulated that in considering any applications under Art. 8 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), ‘little weight should be given to 
[private and family life] that is established by a person at a time when the person is in 
the United Kingdom unlawfully’ or even while ‘the person’s immigration status is pre-
carious’ (United Kingdom, 2002). This formally illegalises any integration efforts by 
irregular migrants in order to reduce their legal force as grounds for regularisation and/
or barriers to deportation.
Deportation represents the opposite, explicitly exclusionary end of the spectrum of 
available measures to reduce the number of unlawful residents. In practice, only a rela-
tively small fraction of all individuals who are theoretically eligible for deportation is 
actually deported (Gibney, 2008), while many of them may (eventually) also qualify for 
regularisation unless they have committed a crime. It is thus not so much the act of depor-
tation itself that is decisive, but most immigrants’ inherent ‘deportability’ (De Genova, 
2002), a condition that ranges from facing immediate expulsion to being under very little 
threat of actually being deported ever. Both the real and perceived degree of deportability 
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can depend significantly – as do chances for regularisation – on the person’s length of 
stay, level of social attachment, cultural adaptation and criminal record. In the United 
Kingdom, the steady growth in deportations since the end of the 1980s initially coincided 
with a sharp increase in asylum applications and the number of persons removed follow-
ing negative asylum decisions rose from 1820 in 1993 to 13,500 in 2003 (Gibney, 2008), 
after which it continuously declined to reach just over 5000 in 2014. Overall, the number 
of removals and so-called ‘voluntary departures’ of individuals facing a removal order, 
however, continued to steadily increase to over 40,000 in 2014, according to Home Office 
statistics. This development was accompanied by an unprecedented politicisation of the 
issue of deportation as an indispensable means to regain control over unwanted immigra-
tion and several governments have introduced policy innovations that were ‘highly suc-
cessful in enabling officials to bypass legal and social constraints to boost the rate of 
removals’ (Gibney, 2008: 158–159). These include measures to speed up the asylum pro-
cedure itself, the increased use of (potentially indefinite) detention in order to prevent 
prospective deportees from absconding, as well as severe cuts to legal aid for people fac-
ing deportation.
Reflecting the legal framework for regularisation, most judicial appeals against depor-
tation orders are based on either the strong social and cultural ties a person has established 
within the United Kingdom and/or the complete lack of such links to his or her country of 
citizenship. Also, and unlike during most of the 2000s, the vast majority of those more 
recently deported from the United Kingdom had never claimed asylum and are thus not 
automatically known to the immigration authorities.5 Under these conditions, the effec-
tiveness of the deportation regime increasingly hinges on a series of accompanying meas-
ures of in-country immigration control and enforcement as well as legal and practical 
barriers to the integration of unlawful residents. In October 2013, then home secretary 
Theresa May publicly defended the government’s ‘hostile environment’ approach, saying 
that:
it can’t be fair for people who have no right to be here in the UK to continue to exist as everybody 
else does with bank accounts, with driving licences and with access to rented accommodation. 
[…] What we don’t want is a situation where people think that they can come here and overstay 
because they’re able to access everything they need.6
Accordingly, the three main objectives of the 2014 Immigration Act were ‘to make it 
(i) easier to identify illegal immigrants […], (ii) easier to remove and deport illegal immi-
grants [… and] (iii) more difficult for illegal immigrants to live in the UK’ (Home Office, 
2013). The latter in particular is to be achieved by introducing an obligation for private 
landlords and certain National Health Service staff to check the immigration status of 
their tenants and patients, a prohibition on banks opening accounts for irregular migrants 
and new powers to check driving licence applicants’ immigration status and revoke the 
licences of those who have overstayed. Despite widespread criticism from civil society 
organisations, the government intends to further extend some of these measures and cre-
ate a new criminal offence of illegal working that will allow the authorities to seize irreg-
ular migrants’ earnings (Home Office, 2015).
These policies not only shift part of the state’s responsibility for immigration control 
from public agencies to private actors and institutions but specifically aim to combat 
irregular migration through the control and sanctioning of unlawful residents’ social and 
economic relations with others (Walsh, 2014). Together with increasing restrictions and 
control placed on their access to social rights and basic welfare services, as well as stiffer 
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sanctions imposed on anyone willing to employ them, these measures will make irregular 
migrants’ everyday lives, housing and working conditions even more precarious. While 
usually justified as a way to thereby stimulate their ‘voluntary’ return, such approaches 
have been shown to be pushing irregular migrants even further ‘underground’ (Broeders 
and Engbersen, 2007) and to put a disproportional burden on several ‘key social transac-
tions’ (Cvajner and Sciortino, 2010b). This increases not only their dependence on friends 
and family members but also their exploitability by unscrupulous employers and criminal 
networks. The line between support and exploitation is thereby often blurred (Engbersen 
et al., 2006), and the increasing criminalisation of various dealings with persons whose 
presence in the country is unlawful generates uncertainty among public servants and 
furthers discrimination against non-European (looking) immigrants and even citizens 
(Migrants’ Rights Network (MRN), 2015; Spencer and Hughes, 2015).
The following section explores the everyday effects of these legal frameworks and 
policies through the accounts of those who are their primary target. The data come from 
a series of semi-structured interviews conducted mostly between July 2014 and February 
2015, with a total of 12 people (6 males, 6 females) from various non-EU countries, aged 
between 20 and 50, who had been living in London for between 1.5 and 20 years. None 
of them had an immigration status at the time of the interview although some had previ-
ously had a visa while others were awaiting the outcome of outstanding applications for 
LTR. Contact was mostly made via non-governmental organisations (NGOs), one of 
which I volunteered with during the whole period. All names are synonyms chosen by the 
respondents unless they insisted on their real names being used.
The migrant perspective: ‘I established my life here, but the 
basis is not solid’
Almost all my respondents describe the lack of a legal immigration status as the one thing 
that holds them back, the reason for ‘being stuck’ and unable to progress, earn and save 
money and ‘build a future’ for themselves or their families. But at the same time, they are 
well aware that although excluded in many respects, they are still integrated in others, as 
described by Carlos, a 32-year-old Bolivian citizen who has been living in London for 
more than 10 years:
Even though one is ‘illegal’ in the country, automatically you are integrated. The only difference 
is that one cannot do certain things, like to vote or voice a political opinion, and you cannot 
travel to another country or go on holidays. […] The only difference is that they put certain 
barriers so that we cannot integrate more. But I think that all the ‘illegals’ are automatically 
integrated in the country. […] The fact, for example, that we go to the gym, we work, we 
normally live our lives – because we live our life the same way all the other people do, just that 
for us it’s a little bit harder than for a person that lives normally, I think. Or that we may have a 
certain dream but we cannot fulfil it because they don’t allow us to study or something like that. 
But apart from that, if you speak of integration … that’s what we automatically do. We are 
talking to other people … and nobody is forbidding us that. And so … I think that society accepts 
us. But … how should I say this? I think that something in the system does not want to permit 
that we really enter, or I don’t know, but I think that they are afraid that if that happens more 
people will want to come.
Carlos arrived in April 2004 on a student visa, which he annually renewed for 4 years 
while studying (English and information technology (IT)) and working (first as a window 
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cleaner, later in construction) under his real name and National Insurance Number (NINo). 
He also completed training under the Construction Skills Certification Scheme (CSCS), 
which gives access to more qualified jobs in the sector. But in 2008 he lost his job, could 
not pay the fees for the renewal of his visa and thus became irregular. He is aware that his 
only chance for regularisation is ‘to wait nine and a half more years’ in order to qualify 
under the long residence rule. Talking about his integration in the United Kingdom, he 
differentiates, on one hand, between everyday activities and interactions as opposed to the 
things that ‘they’ don’t allow him to do, like to vote or pursue his education, and on the 
other hand, between ‘society’, by which he feels quite accepted, and ‘the system’ that tries 
to reject him. But even in relation to the latter, he does not describe his situation as one of 
complete exclusion: ‘can you imagine that until now I continue to apply for my CSCS card 
and all those things, being “illegal”? All I have to do is to order it online and they send it 
to me … as long as my [NINo] is OK and I am paying taxes and all that’. Because he has 
a NINo, a bank account and is registered with a local health centre – all of which he 
obtained when he was still ‘regular’ – it also feels quite safe for him to continue working 
(as a self-employed construction worker). But since a friend of his ‘got caught’ (and later 
deported) while waiting at the entrance of a ‘Latino concert’, he tries to avoid such social 
events and stays away from his ‘own community’, which he feels has recently become the 
focus of immigration raids. He thus constantly weighs the potential risk of detection 
against the benefits of deepening his social and economic ties, as Sigona (2012) has indi-
cated. On one hand, he has thereby managed to become everybody by living (much of) 
his everyday life in ‘the same way all the other people do’, which is exactly what the 
Immigration Act 2014 seeks to inhibit. On the other, he enacts at least certain aspects of his 
citizenship by working and paying taxes in his own name and even renewing his CSCS 
card – as a way of claiming the right to a better job and pay – despite ‘being illegal’.
While Carlos only became irregular after several years of lawful residence in the 
United Kingdom, during which he ‘legally’ integrated into both society and ‘the system’, 
Dora (32, from Colombia) and her partner entered the country in 2001 with false Spanish 
passports and identities after her application for a student visa had been denied. She 
nonetheless studied for a couple of months until she realised that graduating ‘as some-
body else’ would never formally benefit her own career. So she dropped the course and 
instead started working as a cleaner, while her partner found cash-in-hand jobs in con-
struction. Their first attempt to ‘become legal’ was by paying £5000 each to a Colombian 
man they barely knew, who offered to organise forged residence permits for them, but 
soon after disappeared with their money. A couple of months later, their first son was 
born, and after another 2 years of working under false identities and living together in one 
room of an apartment they shared with Dora’s brother (who is a UK citizen), they sought 
legal advice from various immigration solicitors, who told them to wait until their child 
turned 7. At the time of my first interview with her, in September 2014, her son was 
already 8 years old but their situation still unresolved. ‘In order to win time’, as her law-
yer had called it, they had repeatedly submitted applications for LTR on the grounds of 
their private and family life in the United Kingdom, all of which have been refused with 
no right of appeal. In the meantime, Dora was working as a housekeeper and babysitter 
for several people she was referred to by friends, learned English and obtained an official 
qualification (in her own name) in Teaching English as a Foreign Language. With the 
help of the head teacher of her son’s primary school (who knew her situation), she also 
took courses to become a Teaching Assistant and volunteered as a Reading Assistant, all 
of which is recognised in several court decisions. In November 2014, the family was 
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notified of the Home Office’s decision to deport them and – as a vivid reminder of their 
deportability – ordered to report to an immigration officer every 2 weeks. In June 2015, 
their application for permission to appeal against the removal decision was also dis-
missed. Despite this Dora says she is not anymore afraid of being deported because:
if they wanted to kick us out, they would have come already, since they know our address and 
everything. […] At least I know that I am in the system, and they know that I am here. I am not 
doing anything wrong at this moment. […] So this gives me a lot of security.
Given her legal standing, she does not (anymore) want to be ‘imperceptible’ but instead 
appreciates being ‘in the system’ and thus – in Papadopoulos and Tsianos’ (2007: 230) 
terms – ‘integrated […] in the logic of border administration’. Although she is also aware 
that ‘being caught working illegally’ may jeopardise their immigration case, the imminent 
risk of deportation as a result of becoming visible or being known to the immigration 
authorities is (at least temporarily) suspended under the protection of human rights law. 
This allows her and her family to enact themselves as political subjects by openly claim-
ing the right to stay.
Unlike Dora, respondents without children in the United Kingdom have never even 
tried to officially become themselves by making a legal claim for regularisation or other 
rights ‘because I am 100 per cent sure that they would bring me back, that’s the problem 
…’, says Florian (24) from Albania. Instead, they prefer to ‘stay under the radar’ and 
accept exploitative working conditions, low wages and excessive housing costs, as well 
as being denied all access to rights and services including those – like primary health care 
– that they are formally entitled to. It is for them in particular that ‘the possibility of 
removal […] casts a long, dark shadow over their daily lives, threatening at any moment 
to take away from them the little they have gained by residence in the host country’ 
(Gibney, 2011: 43). Pimi, a 30-year-old from Albania, has left and re-entered the country 
four times since he first arrived in the United Kingdom in 2000 ‘on the back of a lorry’. 
Over almost 15 years, he has worked for several employers under three different names, 
and thus been ‘paying the taxes of somebody else’, as he notes, while recurring deporta-
tions have fragmented his stay and professional trajectory:
It sounds like a game. But […] I have done it for real. It’s my fifth time of coming to the country. 
Three times deported, once after the prison [in 2014 he was sentenced to one year in prison for 
entering with forged documents], and once I went by myself.
But after all, he says it was still worth it, even though his becoming everybody through 
the use of multiple identities has not only been a risky but also very costly strategy: ‘I had 
to pay lots of money to travel back and forth and all that buying my [false] driving license 
and papers and everything … but I worked it out. I spent more than [£30,000] only for 
that’. His account also reflects what Vasta (2011: 199) calls ‘irregular formality’: the 
attempt by irregular migrants ‘to “regularize” themselves [where] this is not possible 
through legal means’. It has allowed Pimi, despite the discontinuity of his stay, to pro-
gress professionally (to the position of a ‘construction manager’) and to save money for 
an uncertain future:
I am working six days a week just to make the most out of my life while I am still in the country; 
to try and make sure that one day when I will be stopped, at least I will have my savings.
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He thereby clearly anticipates the government’s latest plans to make it impossible for 
irregular migrants to open a bank account:
I have paid someone to open an account in the name which I use for the paperwork and all that; 
so I [have] an account, but I can’t really keep my money there, […] because if I get stopped, or 
if the bank finds out … they could close my account or freeze my money […]. And as I said, 
there is always this chance.
He was not the only one telling me that his best option is to rely on friends or work 
colleagues to keep his savings in their accounts, although he is aware that they could quite 
easily claim the money was theirs: ‘What could I do? I don’t think that I can do anything 
about it, but I have trusted him now, so hopefully that won’t happen’. Besides the sensa-
tion that their futures and livelihoods are not in their own hands but contingent on others 
as well as ‘the system in this country’, several of my respondents also expressed the feel-
ing that trying to follow the rules of this system is more difficult than breaking or bending 
them, as Carlos tried to explain:
Sometimes this country closes all the doors to becoming [regular]. It pushes you to continue to 
commit mistakes. It’s like … you try to get out by doing the right thing, but you cannot. The very 
system pushes you to try and do the wrong thing.
Both Carlos and Pimi told me that they would have had the opportunity to marry their 
former girlfriends, but did not do it because to them it felt ‘wrong’ (and probably too 
risky) to marry ‘just for the papers’. Other respondents at some point felt pushed towards 
the asylum route. While Dora rejected this possibility when suggested by a lawyer – 
‘because I came here for economic reasons, not because I was in danger of anything’ – for 
Pimi it had led straight to his first deportation. Salim (36), on the other hand, who had fled 
Algeria in 2004 but only decided to claim asylum after several years of living and work-
ing in the United Kingdom irregularly, now finds himself ‘stuck’ after the Home Office 
rejected his claim but has not (yet) been able to deport him:
At the beginning my situation was OK, better than now. Before was OK, well, OK and not OK. 
I was working illegally, under a false name, with fake documents […]. But I enjoyed my life, I 
received my salary, I lived in a nice house, had a good job, ate good food, I did sports … I had 
a good life. But I wanted to be a legal person, like everybody else; work in my own name, to be 
myself. That’s why I wanted to change my situation. I thought that everything would become 
better, but everything got worse. Now I don’t have anything. No place to stay, no work, no 
house, no … money, no nothing. I am stuck.
Unlike Dora, he would now rather prefer not to ‘be in the system’, but after disclosing 
his real identity and having his fingerprints taken as part of the asylum procedure, he can-
not (anymore) become imperceptible. In various ways, the people I spoke to thus con-
veyed a feeling that they were not only being punished for their irregularity but also for 
trying to become themselves, in order to obtain rights or to regularise their situation. 
Looking back, Dora notes that:
it was much easier to do things the wrong way, much easier to enter [Spain], get a false passport, 
enter [the UK] with this false passport; even to find work illegally was much easier than now 
that I want to do things right.
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When I met her in October 2015, she gave me a copy of the final (negative) decision 
of the court regarding the appeal against her and her family’s removal, which concluded 
that:
there would be no significant obstacles to [their] integration into the country to which they 
would have to go if required to leave the UK, namely Colombia. […] [While they] have been 
motivated to work and keep themselves without the need to claim welfare benefits and to build 
a life in the UK notwithstanding the precarious nature of their stay […] [they] and their children 
maintain an association with Colombian society through socialising with members of the 
Colombian community living in the UK […] and [Dora’s] employment prospects in particular 
are likely to have been enhanced by the English language and teaching skills she has acquired 
since she came to the UK.
To her honest surprise, her very efforts to integrate in the United Kingdom were being 
used against her. But she also knew that in January of the following year, her son – being 
born in the United Kingdom and having lived there continuously for the first 10 years of 
his life – would qualify for registration as a British citizen, which opens another route for 
the family to lawfully settle in the country, unless the rules are tightened once again.
Conclusion
Migrant irregularity is the relationship between the legal-political framework through 
which the state seeks to manage immigration and the strategies of those who are excluded 
from this increasingly blurred picture. Irregular migrants’ agency essentially takes place 
between two poles: the threat of deportation and the prospect of regularisation. It must 
thus be understood not just in terms of resistance against exclusion but also as an initia-
tive towards inclusion. The chances for both are structured by state laws and effectuated 
through a set of policies, which together function as ‘carrots and sticks’, incentivising 
irregular migrants to become visible in some contexts (and under certain conditions) but 
invisible in others. I have looked at a case where formal paths to regularisation are both 
narrow and few, while the risk of deportation is relatively high and more and more 
instances of their becoming part of, and accepted by society, are explicitly being illegal-
ised. The aim was to highlight the various ways in which irregular migrants manage to 
self-integrate even in a comparatively ‘hostile environment’, and not only against but also 
within existing legal frameworks.
Both Isin’s conceptualisation of ‘acts of citizenship’ and Papadopoulos and Tsianos’ 
notion of ‘becoming everybody’ and thereby ‘imperceptible’ help to understand crucial 
aspects of irregular migrants’ agency. But as my empirical data and analysis suggest, 
neither of them does justice to the full range of practices they employ and combine in 
order to strengthen their position vis-à-vis the state. A crucial aspect of their agency seems 
to consist precisely in identifying the right moment(s) for actively constituting them-
selves as political subjects or deliberately refusing to do so, whereby they constantly 
interact with evolving regimes of rights and control.
As a possible way of combining the two theoretical frameworks, I therefore suggest 
that it makes sense – both empirically and conceptually – to look at irregular migrants’ 
agency in terms of integration: On one hand, it is through deliberate ‘acts’ of self-integra-
tion into ‘the system’ that they enact themselves as citizens of the very state that explicitly 
tries to exclude them. They thereby ‘break away’ from the official script of integration as 
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a set of practices that exclusively belong to the realm of legal settlement and formal citi-
zenship. On the other hand, it is by ‘blending into society’ and trying to live a life ‘like 
everybody else’ that they can effectively escape not only from immigration enforcement 
but also from their normalised representation as ‘illegally present’ and thus necessarily 
marginalised, isolated and deprived of rights, power and opportunities. ‘We are talking to 
other people … and nobody is forbidding us that’ is how Carlos hints at a very basic yet 
essential kind of social capital that ‘is hard to control because of its legitimate character’, 
as Broeders and Engbersen (2007: 1597) have shown for those informal support networks 
that often help migrants in irregular situations to sustain their livelihoods and prolong 
their stay in the country. This, in turn, explains why the government reacts by implement-
ing policies that increasingly target everybody, as a way of trying to induce hostility into 
these relationships. The broader and long-term consequences that this approach will have 
for social cohesion, race relations and local communities are, at best, uncertain.
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Notes
1 Here, I generally use the term ‘irregular migrants/residents’ for persons who do not have a formal right of 
residence in the country where they live. I prefer ‘irregular’ over ‘undocumented’ – which tends to hide 
the fact that many of them are ‘documented’ in the sense of possessing official documents that certify their 
identity – as well as ‘illegalised’, which might (falsely) be understood as suggesting that every aspect of 
their being in the country is made unlawful, whereas in fact at least some of their claims and entitlements 
are always safeguarded by national or international law.
2 It is important to note that ‘the state’ which is responsible for these decisions is not a unified and mono-
lithic entity, but a fragmented aggregation of various administrative levels and bodies driven by different 
and often contradictory interests and functional imperatives, as is reflected in the notion of an ‘assem-
blage’ of governance (Walters, 2015) or state power (Allen and Cochrane, 2010).
3 T. May, cited in The Telegraph, 25 May 2012: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/immigra-
tion/9291483/Theresa-May-interview-Were-going-to-give-illegal-migrants-a-really-hostile-reception.
html
4 See Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas (2015) for a recent review and discussion of the concept(s) of 
integration.
5 According to official statistics, their share has continuously increased from 40% in 2004 to 82.5% in 2014.
6 T. May, speaking on BBC Radio 4’s ‘Today’ programme, cited in The Guardian, 10 October 2013: http://
www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/oct/10/immigration-bill-theresa-may-hostile-environment
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